


Central Africa Conflict Analysis

*(Originally created for the Background Section of
American Friends Service Committee's Program Plan for Central Africa.)*



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AFSC's Central Africa Program focuses on Rwanda, Burundi and eastern D. R. Congo (North and South Kivu) because at this stage of its development, the scale of the program needs a fairly narrow geographic limit. But the conflict analysis upon which the program is based includes surrounding countries and the rest of D. R. Congo. Canadian Friends Service Committee also supports Friends' work in this region, as way opens.

The components of this conflict analysis are: Conflict Profile, Causes of Conflict, (Structural, Proximate and Triggers) Conflict Actors and Conflict Dynamics.

A. Conflict Profile

Colonial inheritance

(This section is based on the acclaimed work of Jean-Pierre Chrétien, *The Great Lakes of Africa : Two Thousand Years of History*, published in 2003¹)

When Europeans arrived in the Great Lakes region they found a number of monarchies who, much like the Europeans, were often in conflict with each other over territory. The principal monarchies were those of the Buganda, Ruanda and Urundi and their political consolidation was only about two centuries old. Within these monarchies, and in the wider region, there was a great deal of linguistic and ethnic diversity which was utilized by the colonial powers to maintain power. In particular this was evident in Ruanda/Urundi where the Germans, and then the Belgians used the Tutsi as indirect rulers for the Hutu and the Twa. The racial social engineering of the colonial administration, which saw the creation of a Tutsi superiority mystique, and the favouring of Tutsis for economic, educational and administrative opportunities, was supported by the newly introduced and increasingly influential Catholic Church.

The patterns of colonial economic development, including extraction of natural resources and agricultural produce with little investment in secondary industry or social services, were evident in both the British-controlled (Uganda and western Tanzania) and the Belgian-controlled regions (Burundi, Congo and Rwanda). However, the British approach to economic colonialism afforded more opportunity for local people, and during the latter generation of colonial times, many migrants from neighbouring Congo and Rwanda entered Uganda to work, often as agricultural labourers.

There were also biological impacts of contact with Europeans as diseases were introduced which decimated successive generations of humans and of animals around the turn of the 20th century. The population didn't reach its pre-contact level until 1950 and has suffered a

¹ Jean-Pierre Chrétien (2003) *The Great Lakes of Africa : Two Thousand Years of History*. Urzone: New York. ISBN 1-890951-34-X. 503 pp including dynastic charts, maps, endnotes, bibliography and index. Translated by Scott Straus from the French, first published 2000 by Aubier.

traumatic, lasting impact, creating a demand for a high birth rate and creating a predominantly young population .

After independence

After independence, Uganda suffered a succession of military dictatorships that drew upon the frustrations and disparities created by the British use of the Buganda as indirect rulers. The Lord's Resistance Army, led by Joseph Kony, began attacking civilians in northern Uganda in

1986, and has caused massive and extreme suffering ever since. The LRA has no political objectives while purporting to represent the grievances of the Acholi ethnic group; but it is the

Acholi who suffer the killings, the abduction of children to become fighters, auxiliaries, and sex

slaves. The Ugandan National Army has proven incapable or unwilling to defend the population and peace negotiations have never been held with good faith on either side.

Museveni's bad relations with northern neighbor, Sudan, where he supports rebel movements as Khartoum supports the LRA., complicate matters.

Intertribal violence in Rwanda also started shortly after independence, nurtured by a few years of reverse racism. Over the years, a few Hutu families had been able to educate their children and by 1957, there were enough Hutu nurses, agronomists, and teachers to comprise a "counter-elite" to "Tutsi Feudalism". Both Hutu and Tutsi elites circulated racist concepts denigrating the other group and denying any fraternal link. At Independence, the PARMEHUTU party won the elections overwhelmingly (Hutus were more than 70% of the population). The pogroms that they had already organized, and the assassinations of Hutu leaders that followed in retaliation, were not seen as reasons to rethink the framework for independence.

As the years passed, under violent pressure from Hutu supremacists, many Tutsis fled to Uganda, where many already had relatives who had migrated for economic reasons in the previous generation. Some of them became an identifiable part of the Ugandan army, with Paul Kagame as one of their leaders under Museveni who was a general then. By 1990, Rwanda had been ruled by a Hutu supremacist dictatorship through the PARMEHUTU party, for 24 years.

The latest leader was Juvénal Habyarimana. The premise of the dictatorship's claim to power was a threat from Tutsi people who were supposedly planning to reinstate their supremacy from the colonial era. Blatant anti-Tutsi propaganda and oppression reminiscent of Nazi methods was the order of the day.

So many years in unquestioned power had led to a lot of neglect, including a neglected armed force. In October 1990, Kagame invaded from Uganda, with a leadership that included balance-minded Hutus, to liberate Rwanda from a human-rights-abusing government. In August 1993, there was a cease-fire negotiated that provided for a power-sharing interim government with roles for both Kagame and Habyarimana, and a UN peacekeeping force that was much smaller than had been recommended. In April 1994, with the capital very tense, the Hutu president's airplane was shot down at the Kigali airport.

It is still not clear at whose command this was done. This event triggered the emotion

necessary to sustain the genocide that followed, which was organized by military and government authorities in every community. 800,000 Tutsis and moderate Hutus were killed. Thousands of young people without a future were transformed into killers; they were caught up in war hysteria, and the desire to do a good job, and in the hysteria of licit pillage, encouraged sadism, and calculated cruelty.

Kagame ordered his army to take the whole country, stopping the genocide by killing many of the people organizing it. Certainly many innocent Hutus were killed as well. A large number of Rwandans, including what was left of the Rwandan army, fled into Eastern Congo, primarily in

the Kivu provinces. An estimated 8,000 of them formed five battalions under the command of General Sylvestre Mudacumura, eventually taking the name Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda. Many also fled to Burundi, but did not form an armed force there.

The politics of independence in Burundi were not ethnically polarized. However, only a month after UN-supervised legislative elections delivered an overwhelming majority to UPRONA in September 1961, the newly elected president Prince Luis Rwagasore was assassinated. In an atmosphere of mourning independence was declared on July 1, 1962, and “the Rwandan syndrome” rapidly infiltrated the Burundian elites: to the Tutsi, the spectacle of the tens of thousands of Rwandan Tutsi refugees inspired distrust of the Bahutu; and to the Hutu, the prospect of having absolute power seemed a very tempting option in the wake of Kigali’s “social revolution.” “But if relations between the two protagonists were different, the socio-ethnic antagonism, defined as structural, slowly crystallized into an obsessive fear: of a solution founded on a binary majority-minority relationship that would entail evicting one group or the other from the political arena.” (ibid, p. 312) It was a self-fulfilling prophecy.

It is also important to remember the role of external players and the influence of the Cold War. Debates raged over how to align on the international scene and both sides of the global conflict took an interest in the region due to the wealth of natural resources such as Uranium.

The pattern of the post-independence period in Burundi differed from that of Rwanda as coups and counter-coups meant that both Hutu and Tutsi held power at different times. The period was also characterized by instances of extreme violence on both sides with ethnic massacres taking place on different occasions. In the late 1980’s, after a spate of violence on both sides of the ethnic divide, the international community denounced the Buyoya regime and the military dictator agreed to a plan to democratize politics in Burundi. A balanced interim government was formed and wrote a multi-party constitution which led to elections in 1993, the first since 1965.

Melchior Ndadaye, of the Front for Democracy in Burundi (FRODEBU) became the first civilian elected president of the republic, backed by a FRODEBU majority in the legislature. “This victory was seen on all sides as Hutu revenge. But the president affirmed his desire to end the “ethnic sickness” and formed a cabinet that was a third Tutsi and presided over by a technocrat close to UPRONA, Sylvie Kinigi.” (p.320)

This promising new beginning was destroyed in October, four months after the election, by another military coup. The army was still controlled by Tutsis. The next 10 years brought war and the segregation of the population: Tutsis created internally displaced persons camps near army installations, Hutus organized refuges in the forests to avoid the army. In Bujumbura, the Kamenge suburb became a fortified camp of Hutu militias, and bands of young Batutsi eliminated any other armed Hutu in the city. A splinter from FRODEBU, the FDD, organized armed opposition with a base in South Kivu where it controlled the gold trade.

The FDD grew and fragmented, and both sides preyed on peasants for provisions. In

1996, former president Buyoya retook power from an ineffective un-elected coalition brokered by UN envoy Ahmedou Ould Abdallah, and surrounding countries responded immediately with an embargo that destroyed what was left of the Burundian economy, twisting it towards corruption and monopoly, but moderating the new military government's repression of political freedom. One of his responses to try and strengthen his army was to organize groups of teenagers, give them weapons and no training and no pay, and give them the responsibility for patrolling the communities where they lived. This cadre was called "Les Jeunes Gardiens de la Paix".

The fragmentation of the armed opposition made peace negotiations extremely difficult but in 2000 the Arusha Accord saw the creation of a comprehensive terms of reference for power sharing. The transitional government prescribed in the Accord was not able to effectively start its work until after the accompanying ceasefire agreement was signed in 2001. After many set-backs, the transitional government was able to provide the environment for free and fair elections that took place from July to September 2005, a little less than a year behind schedule. The UN peacekeeping mission to Burundi (ONUB) replaced the AU mission in May 2004. Its mandate can be found in Appendix 1.

An analysis of the International Crisis Group's reports for the period reveal two critical factors in the delays of the peace process. One was the political rivalries within and among the various camps and the other was the cat-and-mouse game that the international donors played with respect to humanitarian assistance and funding for the institutions of the transition.

During all those years of military dictatorship, both before and during the war, Burundi did not have a free-market economy. Members of the elite ran state-granted monopolies, and even co-operatives had a coercive element: citizens were required to be members. This means that the creative capacity of entrepreneurship has never been nourished, and this slows the rate at which jobs are created.

Hints of the history of the Democratic Republic of the Congo have appeared in the stories told above of Uganda, Rwanda and Burundi. The Belgian administration of this largest country in Equatorial Africa was brutally extractive and left almost no infrastructure behind at independence. Geographically and linguistically, it is a very difficult country to unify and in some parts of the country conflict takes on an ethnic element.

The struggle for independence in Congo was difficult, and fraught with Cold War interference. Patrice Lumumba, who is now seen as a skilled leader with the interests of the people at heart, was assassinated shortly after independence in 1960, and replaced by Mobutu, who ruled as a dictator until 1996 when he was ousted as a result of the armed rebellion led by Laurent Kabila, supported by Rwanda's Kagame and Uganda's Museveni. Kabila's home is in the east. His rebellion was widely supported by the population who were interested in ending Mobutu's rule. Mobutu had done nothing to improve the country's physical or social infrastructure, but accepted large bilateral aid and loans from the international community. He did not build a national army.

Investigations have shown that the rebellion was financed through sales of natural resources mined in the eastern part of the country, notably in North and South Kivu provinces and in their northern neighbor bordering Uganda, Kasai Orientale (towns like Ituri and Bunia). After ousting Mobutu, Kabila repudiated his Rwandan and Ugandan supporters, who then began supporting other rebel movements in the eastern part of the country. Revenues to support the arming of these groups continue to come from mining activities controlled by armed groups. Kabila invited help from Angola, Zimbabwe and Namibia to oppose his former allies. He also supplied the ex-Rwandan FDLR as allies against Rwanda, and this allegiance was not ended until 2002.

After his assassination in 1999, his son Joseph Kabila participated in peace talks, the “Inter- Congolese Dialogue”, which finally bore fruit in 2002 with the Global and All-Inclusive Agreement. The withdrawal of Angolan, Namibian and Zimbabwean forces on the one side, and Burundian forces as well, has greatly reduced the intensity of the violence. The current world’s largest UN peacekeeping force, MONUC, has been deployed in Congo. The transitional government is a power-sharing arrangement between rival military groups and Joseph Kabila.

At no time since independence has eastern Congo had a free market economy supported by standard economic institutions like banks, effective postal system, insurance. For many years now, the eastern Congo economy has been using US dollars for currency and most people have not developed basic entrepreneurial skills.

Since 1994 when the fleeing Rwandan army took refuge in D. R. Congo, the number of armed groups of Congolese origin has also grown. Some of these are politically organized and have representatives in the transitional government while others do not. Of these, the strongest and most organized is the Mai-Mai, but there are many smaller groups who are more like bands of brigands whose allegiance can be swayed by the more powerful groups.

Current configuration

Although the situation is less terrible now than it has been since 1996, the region is still more characterized by war than by peace.

The Rusizi River is the border between Burundi and the D. R. Congo. The land on both sides of the river is forested. On the Burundian side, the province of Cibitoke is terrorized by a Burundian rebel group, the FNL, that did not join the peace accords or participate in the elections. Cibitoke also borders Rwanda to the north. Almost weekly there is a report of attacks against civilians in Cibitoke, and the road through the province towards Cyangungu in Rwanda is not secure. On the Congolese side, armed groups attack civilians often, with events large enough to be reported in Burundi happening more than once a month. The allegiance of the armed groups is illusive. They are operating more as bandits than as a rebel movement. However, the newly integrated Congolese army and the MONUC peacekeeping forces have not been able to have any impact on reducing this threat.

In North Kivu, where D.R. Congo borders Rwanda, the remaining FDLR forces, a new identity for the Rwandan Hutu supremacist militia that had enacted the genocide and was chased out of the country by Kagame's invasion forces, still attack civilians in search of provisions. There are also other armed groups and rebel armies here and in the provinces further north that border Uganda.

Where are the arms that the various groups and forces in Congo and Burundi are using coming from? Local people continue to suspect Rwanda and Uganda, who had backed Kabila in 1996, and attacked on their own account in 1998.

Northern Uganda continues to suffer terrorization by the Lord's Resistance Army. This massive humanitarian crisis has been going on for nearly 20 years. There is also a Ugandan rebel army, called the Allied Democratic Forces, which harbours in North Kivu and attacks across the border into Western Uganda.

To quote the International Crisis Group², "President Museveni pursues a military solution (to the Lords Resistance Army insurgency) in part to justify the unreformed army that is a key pillar of his regime. Indeed, the war helps him justify and maintain the status quo in Ugandan politics, denying his opposition a power base and offering numerous opportunities for curtailing freedom of expression and association in the name of "the war against terrorism". As long as the situation in the North is dominated by security

matters, the monopolization of power and wealth by Southerners is not put into question.“ (ICG 2004)

² International Crisis Group, *Northern Uganda: Understanding and Solving the Conflict, Africa Report No. 77*, 14 April, 2004.

Uganda is preparing for elections in February 2006. In mid 2005, Museveni convinced the one-party national parliament to amend the constitution to lift the limit on the number of terms a president can hold. He jailed his principal political rival, who is also a Southerner, for nearly two months as 2005 turned to 2006.

The international community has been encouraging the opening up of Uganda's political structure during the tenure of Museveni's National Resistance Movement. In the latter part of

2005, we are beginning to see evidence of censure of his use of force with his neighbours. The December 19, 2005 decision of the International Court of Justice that Uganda owes a war indemnity to D. R. Congo for attacks in 1998 and after is evidence of this. A concerted international effort with regard to northern Uganda is still lacking, though political will may be building.

Rwanda

Rwanda will have local elections, to elect authorities from the municipal to the provincial level, in January 2006. The population elects the municipal councils, the municipal councilors elect the district councils, and the district councils elect the provincial authorities. This is a system that tends to concentrate authority and eliminate dissenting representation. The official line and the heart-felt wish of most Rwandans is to leave the Tutsi and Hutu identities in the past and construct a new identity as Rwandans, there is currently a concentration of Tutsi people in positions of authority, and their educational advantage from the era before 1970 remains in their favour. The streets of Kigali and the other cities of the entire country are safe at night, a condition that no other country in the region can offer its citizens. Amnesty International has borne witness that there continue to be arrests without due process and local human rights organizations walk a fine line. They note that there are still active Hutu supremacists, and that such activities have to stop.

The major social stress in Rwanda is the Gacaca process, which has been in preparation since

1994, and began to be implemented throughout the country in January 2005. The Rwandan government has established the Gacaca system as one initiative to promote reconciliation and justice in the country. Gacaca is a decentralized, community-based system of justice to try people suspected of genocide-related crimes, thus reducing the number of people in very over-crowded prisons, reducing waiting times for court appearances. Gacaca tribunals will be held in each sector of the country. Lists of all the people killed, injured, or raped during the genocide as well as property lost or destroyed have been assembled during the past few years.

As that process has been ongoing, prisoners and current suspects have been given the opportunity to confess their crime in return for a reduced sentence. A significant portion of the prisoners have accepted this offer, and many of them have been liberated because their jail sentences are less than the ten years that they have already spent in prison. People will testify before the tribunal about what they know about the killings, rape, and looting that took place. People that are accused, whether or not they are currently under arrest, will have the chance to defend themselves, and then a panel of judges selected from the residents of the district will determine their guilt. They will be

sentenced according to the severity of the crime that they committed. Many sentences include years of community service as restitution.

Rwandan NGOs recognize Gacaca as one positive response to the violence which devastated their country. However, despite its restorative nature, there are still certain problems with the system. The mass liberation in a short period of time of people who had been imprisoned for genocide-related crimes in all the provinces of the country has many difficult consequences:

- the husbands or wives of prisoners may have remarried (officially or unofficially) and had children in their absence, leading to many awkward and legally difficult situations and conflicts
- the husbands or wives of prisoners may have sold their property or been unable to maintain it
- someone else may have taken over the property of the ex-prisoners, unused or under-utilized for ten or more years
- genocide survivors are traumatized and frightened by the sight of the people who may have murdered their families and neighbours re-entering their communities
- prisoners' family members may learn the truth for the first time about what the prisoners did during the genocide.
- many people have conflicts in the family when they are called to testify during the Gacaca process, because much of the killing took place within families;
- some witnesses have been threatened or murdered by indicted people to keep them from testifying.
- ex-prisoners are unable to easily find work, especially in a professional capacity as they have to spend a significant amount of time in community work; this leads to further poverty in the community

At the end of July, 22,000 prisoners were released back into the communities under a presidential order. Another 14,000 people are scheduled to be released before the end of the year. These prisoners had confessed to their crimes or were very young at the time of their crimes. Churches and other leaders have been welcoming the returnees, but there remains a lot of tension in the community. In addition, the release has placed a significant burden on families as they struggle to find the means to clothe and feed ex-prisoners, many of whom have significant community service sentences yet to serve.

Also, there are large number of Hutu people who fear the Gacaca process and are seeking refuge in Burundi, which is still in a delicate situation, not very ready to receive them.

Burundi

Burundian elections produced a strong majority for the CNDD-FDD, which is the alliance of the principal rebel groups who signed the peace accord. The current constitution, negotiated at the Arusha peace talks, balances tribal, gender and regional interests carefully, unlike the previous democratic constitution (1992). Political parties themselves were more balanced this time, they tended to use respectful language, and their platforms were not about redressing the interests of one tribe or another.

The Independent National Commission for Elections was able to organize the elections fairly and with the necessary materials and training for independent officials. There were a large number of observers. Persistent, dedicated work by journalists, Ligue Iteka (a local human- rights-focused NGO) and churches and mosques doing civil education work resulted in an electorate that was critical and demanded constructive, democratic behavior from politicians during the election campaign. In

one case, the wife of a prominent member of the former government had begun to revile the members of the opposing parties. She was addressing a crowd in a market place. The people told her to stop talking that way. They kept insisting until she stopped.

There were few election irregularities at the national level (Parliamentary and Senatorial), but the district elections, which were last, showed more incidents of attempted fraud. The district level is the level that effects people's daily lives most directly, but the voter turn out was low,

apparently due to lack of interest after the excitement of the change in the national government. (The first thing that the new government did was to eliminate school fees, which was a very, very popular move. But now the schools, which already work in two shifts, have more students than they have room for.)

The CNDD-FDD's program is participatory and focused on community development.

As a result of the work done during the transition government before the elections, the army is fully integrated ethnically, and the police are going through major reform and retraining. The new government has invited the rebel FNL to peace talks, but FNL has refused. They have been arresting people suspected of being FNL or FNL collaborators. Many are released without incident, but some (4 in December 2005) have testified to having been beaten or tortured. Neutralizing the FNL will be a very difficult task.

The transitional government was also able to make some replacements of incompetent officials with people promoted according to merit, and to improve the fairness and effectiveness of the judicial system, which is yet unable to handle the load of daily, non-political, cases.

The peacekeeping mission in Burundi, ONUB, was scheduled to withdraw completely by the end of February 2006, but its mandate has been prolonged until the first of July. Burundi may become the first case for the UN's new Peacebuilding Commission, because it is in that difficult moment of transition between the signing of the peace accord and the firm establishment of accountable democracy with the whole country at peace.

D. R. Congo

The transitional government in the Congo, established in 2002, by contrast, has not acted faithfully on any of the unity-building provisions of their peace agreement. The former belligerents who form the leadership of the transitional government have all kept parallel command structures within the nominally integrated national army, the Forces Armées de la République Démocratique du Congo (FARDC). They have deflected the World Bank money that was allocated to pay the army, and the unpaid soldiers prey upon civilians. They have not appointed a more balanced staff for local administration offices, or balanced and strengthened the judiciary or the police.

As a result, corruption is still the order of the day, and impunity is the condition at all levels. In the last six months, some politicians have made public appearances in eastern Congo in such a way as to re-inflate dormant ethnic hostilities, and they have not been censured. They have not laid the legal foundations for national elections in a timely way, so it has been extremely difficult for political parties based on other than military power to form. The delays in the preparations for elections have raised the level of uncertainty very high. Now people are very unsure that the process can be completed with credible results before the July 1, 2006 deadline.

The referendum vote did occur in December 2005 with a minimum of irregularities, accepting the constitution by a majority of 78%. In eastern Congo, there had been an

increase in hostile events during the lead-up weeks, giving rise to a lot of fear. Theodore Ngoye, a presidential candidate and the leader of the campaign to convince people to vote “No” called for an annulment due to alleged irregularities, but there were not enough irregularities to support his claim. He was arrested. Meanwhile, the FARDC attacked Mai Mai rebels in Katanga, in the northeast of the country, raising the number of IDPs fleeing this area to over 40,000. Also, the FARDC with UN logistical support are fighting to contain the ADF Ugandan rebels, and 185 FDLR, the armed group of Rwandan origin, returned to Rwanda to disarm, keeping a small but encouraging flow going.

There has been no noticeable improvement in the regulation of the trade in natural resources, either from international processes or national processes.

The workers of the social institutions have not been paid through state channels in 14 years:
justice, postal, education and health systems.

2. Causes of Conflict

The remaining sections of the Conflict Analysis highlight patterns and relationships from the details presented in the Conflict Profile above.

Structural causes

Structural causes are defined as “pervasive factors that have become built into the policies, structures and fabric of a society and may create the pre-conditions for violent conflict”.

Regionally, the history has bequeathed all of these countries with politically active cliques who have built up political and economic vested interests, and who compete for these interests, often violently, without concern for the well-being of the general population.

Ethnic hostility ideologies have been reinforced by the traumas of massacre and rape in all these countries, though each country has its own personality on this theme.

All of the current presidents of all of these countries started political life as rebel commanders. Can they conceive of politics that doesn't depend on the creation of an internal or external enemy?

The population of all these countries has a high proportion of young people. The more disrupted the recent history of the country or district within a country, the higher the unemployment rate, and the higher the proportion of young people who have never been to school. In each country, a proportion of these young people have been taught to kill as part of an armed band or an army.

These countries also have a high proportion of households headed by a woman alone, either because of the deaths of their husbands, or because they have been shunned after being raped. The economic challenges for these women are severe.

Uganda:

- 1) Inequality of opportunity resulting from British Colonial “indirect rule” policy, which used the Baganda to rule other “tribes”.
- 2) Deepening rift between north and south after repeated massacres beginning shortly after independence.
- 3) Belligerent policies of the Museveni-led government, specifically, his unreformed army,
the solid support of the southern majority of voters, and his actions in Congo and

Sudan.

- 4) Political and economic international allegiances that help maintain Museveni and his belligerent policies in place.

Rwanda:

- 1) Since Rwanda and Uganda attacked D. R. Congo in 1996 and 1998, and there are still Ugandans and Rwandans in the eastern provinces, there remains an uncertainty

concerning the intentions of these countries to invade or to undermine peace by supporting armed groups made up of Congolese.

- 2) The continued presence of the armed FDLR on the D. R. Congo side of the border is a threat to Rwanda, requiring Rwanda to stay armed.
- 3) The Gacaca process of trying the people accused of crimes related to the 1994 genocide raises the level of fear and uncertainty. It is a necessary process, but very difficult. This is about replacing impunity with justice, as restorative as possible.
- 4) The political process in Rwanda is not as open as it could be. An example: the tendency for the pyramidal structure of the elections of local authorities to concentrate decision-making towards one party.
- 5) The supremacy ideologies focused on either Hutu or Tutsi ethnicities are not dead.
Arrests of suspected Hutu supremacists continue, with methods criticized by Human Rights groups.

Burundi:

- 1) The remaining rebel movement in control of the Burundian side of the Rusizi valley, the FNL is a threat. The uncertainty of its possible role in possible military interference from Rwanda or Congo amplifies this threat.
- 2) Has the integration of the army and the police gone deep enough to prevent a putsch by a disgruntled political rival?
- 3) The very high unemployment resulting from the non-development of the economy for more than 10 years has produced a large number of near-desperate people, a large proportion of whom are young and a significant proportion of these have been active in armed groups, for example, Les Jeunes Gardiens de la Paix.
- 4) The business culture in Burundi is not conducive to economic growth. For instance: a number of key enterprises have been monopolies or near-monopolies, and their responses to clients and markets are often counter-productive. Lending interest rates are high, even in credit unions whose purpose is to stimulate micro-enterprise.
- 5) The ethnic hostility ideologies have deep roots in the trauma of the last three generations. Will the reconciliation efforts be enough?

D. R. Congo:

- 1) There is very little state structure of any kind in the Congo. The vacuum of structure is the single largest contributor to conflict. The omnipresent corruption is part and parcel of this vacuum. The vacuum presents opportunities for unscrupulous exploitation and attack, whether by some Congolese or by people from neighbouring states, or by neighbouring states as invaders.
- 2) The transitional government, made up of former rebel commanders who have kept their lines of command through the nominal integration of the army (FARDC), are not working on peace.
- 3) The preparations for elections have not provided an opportunity for viable political parties that are not based on rebel military structures to form. It is unlikely that Congolese will have the chance to vote for candidates who are

committed to peace.

- 4) The revenue from often illicit commerce in natural resources is not being used to replace the vacuum of state structure.
- 5) The lack of experience of a relatively stable and structured market economy has left the eastern part of the country especially with a dearth of entrepreneurial skill with which to create jobs, even if there were sources of capital.

Proximate Causes and Triggers

Uganda:

- 1) The deeply destructive psycho-social effects of the war in the north will pose a monumental reintegration and reconstruction challenge when the LRA is stopped. Will some future leadership be able to use that scarring to turn northerners violently against southerners?

Rwanda:

- 1) The stresses listed above in relation to the release of Gacaca prisoners may produce a trigger event.
- 2) The drying climate, and the continued inadequacy of adaptation to low rainfall in the Bugesera area could put unbearable pressure on at least part of the population.
- 3) Instability in Burundi or Congo could generate a trigger event.

Burundi:

- 1) The reintegration process has barely started. There are a large number of unemployed ex-soldiers, refugees are still returning, and there are still people who are taking shelter in internally displaced persons camps. There are a large number of disputes over ownership of land associated with these diverse people looking for ways to sustain themselves. People who want to use military rather than democratic processes to take power could use the frustration and idleness of these people.
- 2) There is a large amount of small arms and light weapons distributed throughout the population.
- 3) The chaotic conditions related to military government and economic embargo that the country passed through in the last twenty years has resulted in a culture of corruption. The new government is trying very hard to end this culture and replace it with a culture of merit. In the process many people will feel their power and way of living threatened. Such people could use the desperation, frustration, or anger of the various poorer segments of society to try to regain their position.
- 4) The government is very new and needs time to become strong to carry out its democratic agenda. Many people fear the impact that an assassination might have in mobilizing fear and anger.
- 5) Instability in Rwanda (e.g., Gacaca refugees) or Congo could generate a trigger event.

Congo:

- 1) How will the armed groups and the politicians who are leaders of armed groups inadequately integrated into the Congolese army respond to the results of the elections?
- 2) What if elections are postponed further?
- 3) How will the people respond if elections produce a government that continues to be irresponsible?

3. Conflict Actors

In the conflict profile above, little space has been given to the people acting for peace. In order to avoid repetition, this section will focus on such actors. The interests, goals, positions, capacities and relationships of the leaders of current or former rebel movements or armed groups, and of various economic or social elites, can be easily deduced from the information already given.

Local Actors

The following table shows two lists of local actors:

Local actors – communities of	Local actors – organizations
Refugees	Churches and Mosques
Returning Refugees	
Internally Displaced People (IDPs)	Faith-based organizations and Secular organizations: Human Rights, Peacebuilding, Development
Returning IDPs	
Ex-combatants, adults (demobilized soldiers or members of armed groups)	Media
Ex-combatants, people recruited or captured when they were children	
People who stayed in their communities	Professional associations: Teachers, nurses, engineers, musicians, artists
Landed peasants	
Un-landed peasants	Universities and colleges
People with small businesses or jobs	
Unemployed people	
City people	

The communities of experience are all people with needs and resources (or at least, social connections) who could interpret their futures in terms of violent conflict or in terms of working through difficulties non-violently. They could become desperate enough to join a violent movement, or be manipulated in other ways. In some cases, they can make choices that will neutralize some of the structural or proximate causes listed above. For instance, if they choose to repudiate the ethnic hostility ideology, it will lose its force.

The local organizations can work in solidarity with the communities of experience to help them meet their challenges non-violently and facilitate reintegration. There are many who are doing this very effectively. For instance, in the D. R. Congo, the Catholic Church has Peace and Justice committees at every level from parish to nation. These committees have been very active in peace education and reconciliation work and in civic education, and they have been monitoring the activities of the armed groups and sending reports to their related offices in Rome, other national capitals, and at the UN in New York and Geneva. Many churches and mosques have set up organizations that have learned how to do very effective reconciliation work, and service to the poor in general.

In Burundi, for example, the media are courageously reporting the good and bad from all sides of the political arena.

Professional associations are as yet an un-tapped resource, but they can have a very important role to play in teaching critical thinking, in reinforcing peace values, in serving everyone equally, in helping find practical solutions that will increase their country's productivity.

The universities and colleges have started to take up the peace challenge as well. There is a leading-edge Centre for Conflict Management at Butare in Rwanda and the universities in Bukavu and Goma and Kampala have Peace Studies programs.

International Community/United Nations

The UN Security Council is the author of all mandates of all UN peacekeeping missions, and of all non-military sanctions, targeted or otherwise. It seems very difficult for the members of the Security Council to put aside their national interest when they are allocating these crucial resources.

Peacebuilding Commission: the patent failure of the international community to implement the promises made in peace accords in a coordinated, effective fashion has been the topic of several studies in the past five years. In response, the Secretary General's High Level Panel in 2004 recommended the establishment of a Peacebuilding Commission, and the General Assembly approved this idea at the Millennium Summit in September 2005. Burundi is a prime candidate for the Commission's maiden voyage, but the development process of this commission is going to require attentive accompaniment to ensure that it remains responsive to practical realities and is able to stay at arm's length from any members state's national interests.

Responsibility to Protect: A new consensus on the responsibility of the international community to protect civilians in countries where the government is incapable or unwilling to do so was reached at the Millennium Summit as well. Yet this is fraught with difficulties:

- Is the international community's responsibility only to protect civilians when massacre is on-going or imminent, or is it to prevent the rise of the kind of power that leads to massacres (Who funded Mobutu? Who is funding the armed bands in the Rusizi valley?)?
- How can the international community intervene in such a way that massacres don't start again as soon as the mandated mission withdraws (as happened in Rwanda in 1994)?
- Having de-escalated and withdrawn, will we have to maintain a serious monitoring presence in perpetuity and be prepared to come back if things take a turn for the worse?
- On how many different fronts in how many different theatres can we realistically sustain this sort of thing?
- If we can't do it for all – and unwillingness to support the expense of doing this in Congo proves that this is likely the case -- is it still moral or responsible to do it just for some? Who or what criteria will determine who really gets rescued?
- Can all the member states accept that real protection is prevention and depends on everyone submitting to early warning scrutiny so that minimum interventions can be taken and be effective?

African Union: The AU has taken on the task of providing some protection for civilians in Darfur, Sudan, after being the first international force in Burundi after the Arusha Accords. There is great good in having an effective regional response. How is the African Union going to be able to respond to the challenge of so many conflicts on the

continent?

International NGOs: very wide range of skill and capacity; more accountable than government- delivered programs in most countries; but dependent on short-term and uncertain funding: will never be able to replace what an accountable government with a fair tax base can do.

International Business Interests (extractive or natural resource industries): How can exploitative extraction be transformed into productive, peaceful, employment opportunities, supporting accountable social and economic infrastructure through appropriate taxes?

4. Conflict Dynamics

One of the most important conflict trends in the region is the **pattern of incomplete response from the international community**. In the above analysis, we have seen that the conflict in the north of Uganda has a major impact on the supply of arms in the region and that the policies of President Museveni of Uganda are more likely to keep that conflict going than to end it. However, the United Nations Security Council is not recognizing that conflict as an international conflict. The gap between mandate and effectiveness for the peacekeeping mission in Congo, MONUC, is another example. MONUC has 16,000 soldiers for an area the size of Western Europe (the U.N. mission to tiny Kosovo, by contrast, had 40,000 troops). In Burundi, the Burundian government and the international community have agreed to extend the ONUB mission for six months, while sending some of its resources to the Congo, as if the very small numbers from the Burundian mission could make the kind of difference necessary there.

There is a related internal condition, which is also a trend. That is for the local people to say “We are at peace” when there is active war in their country. Ugandans from other regions than the north often say their country is at peace. This tendency to ignore the conflict in part of the country creates a condition for that conflict to continue and embed in the national political habit. It causes extreme feelings of alienation for the residents of the part of the country that is at war. Burundians are tending to this condition, though more of them are still recognizing the on-going conflict with the FNL as a continued condition of war.

But people in neighbouring countries have a tendency to say to Burundians, “We are so glad that you are at peace now.” Will Cibitoke develop that deep alienation that is evident in Northern Uganda? And the complex emergency of Eastern Congo drags all attention to that region of the country, reducing attention to conflict issues in other parts of the Congo, which is also extremely fractured and regionalized. The tendency for political leaders to use the conflict in part of their country to sustain their political support, and for the false concept of “our country is at peace” to reinforce that strategy, creates deep fractures of alienation within the countries that will offer peacebuilding challenges for decades.

Political and commercial leaders who use war and who steal national resources for personal gain use the desperation of vulnerable people to keep the conflicts going. So far, the national and international judicial systems have been unable to stop these war-creation activities. There is a difficult dynamic here: if there is a warrant out for a leader’s arrest, what motivation does he have to stop his activities? But action could have been taken to cut off the commerce any time since 1996. Since 2000 or so, the international community has started to use targeted financial sanctions against rebel leaders. It would

be interesting to evaluate their effectiveness and consider how they might be used on other parts of the arms supply chain.

There are a number of local organizations that are working very hard to help local people who have been hurt by the war to reconcile with former enemies and find peaceful, sustainable livelihoods and ways of cooperating with each other. They are building a culture of peace. This work is having a surprising amount of success, especially in Rwanda and Burundi. Coupled with the very effective civic education that preceded the first post-conflict elections in Rwanda and Burundi, these organizations have decreased the tendency for under-educated and vulnerable

people to be recruited into armed rebellion. This work needs to continue and to be linked to strategies to address the first two trends mentioned above.

The high level of unemployment and the lack of investment in social services, water-conserving agricultural methods (Rwanda is ahead of the others in responding to lower rainfall), and health infrastructure means that the vulnerability of the population is an on-going concern. The choice of resorting to arms to meet basic needs is always in front of people, eroding the good work mentioned in the paragraph above.

There are particular tactics that are being used in these wars that present major challenges for building a culture of peace. Command rape, including rape by people infected with AIDS, severely wounds women and destroys families, increasing the vulnerability of so many members of the community. The use of child soldiers, including the kidnapping of children to be used as labourers, sex slaves and soldiers also creates deep psychological wounds that increase the challenge for communities to integrate them into productive, peaceful, sustainable livelihoods.